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MAKING ENDS MEET: USING A MARKETBASED APPROACH TO INCENTIVIZE
FOREIGN VESSELS TO COMPLY WITH
THE AIR EMISSION STANDARDS OF
MARPOL ANNEX VI*
Xiaoxin Shi**
INTRODUCTION
Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) sets mandatory air emission
standards for ocean-going vessels. Ratifying countries are required to
enact legislation to implement MARPOL Annex VI (Annex VI)
within their jurisdictions. The United States adopted Annex VI
through the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS), 1
administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Two
The conclusions of this paper reflect the author’s findings between
late 2013 to early 2014, when the paper was completed. Since then, there have been
new developments in the Chinese policies and regulations on air emissions from
ships and vessels. The most significant development is the new Emission Control
Area (ECA) Implementation Plan, promulgated by the Chinese Ministry of
Transport on December 2, 2015 (http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/201512/04/content_5019932.htm). The Plan establishes three ECAs along China’s
coast. Beginning on January 1, 2016, ports within the three ECAs will start to
require ships to switch to 0.5% sulfur fuel while berthing. Starting on January 1,
2019, all ships will be required to switch to 0.5% sulfur fuel when operating in the
three ECAs. Before December 31, 2019, the Ministry of Transport plans to
evaluate the effectiveness of the fuel switching program and decide whether to
mandate all ships operate within the ECAs to switch to 0.1% sulfur fuel and
whether to extend the geographical scopes of the ECAs.
**
Master of Philosophy 2010, The Chinese University of Hong Kong;
J.D. 2015, The Pennsylvania State University School of Law.
1
The Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1915
(2008).
*
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Emission Control Areas (ECAs) have been established under Annex
VI in the U.S. territory.2 All vessels of United States registry or
nationality to which MARPOL applies, if found to have violated the
emission standards of ECAs within the U.S. territory, are subject to
criminal or in rem civil liabilities.3
The majority of the vessels calling at U.S. ports are registered
in foreign countries, many of which have not yet fully enforced
Annex VI through domestic legislation. 4 Employing judicial
proceedings as the primary instrument to enforce the compliance of
foreign flagged vessels, therefore, could be cumbersome and
expensive administratively, especially considering the large number of
calls at U.S. ports. This paper explores the perspectives of marketbased mechanisms, as supplements to judicial enforcement, to
incentivize the compliance of foreign flagged vessels when operating
in ECAs in the United States, and ultimately, to foster the
enforcement of Annex VI in all major destinies of international
shipping.
This paper first introduces the regulative scheme to enforce
MARPOL Annex VI standards on foreign ships operating in U.S.
waters in Section II. Technological alternatives to achieve compliance
and their constraints are also discussed, along with the review of
The North American Emission Control Area (ECA) was jointly
proposed by the United States, Canada, and France, approved by the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2010 and came into effect on August 1, 2012. See
Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], North American Emission Control Area, Res. MEPC.190(60)
(Mar. 26, 2010). The United States also proposed the United States Caribbean Sea
ECA, which was adopted by the IMO in 2011 and will take effect on January 1,
2014. See Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Designation of the United States Caribbean Sea Emission
Control Area and Exemption of Certain Ships Operation in the North American Emission
Control Area and the United States Caribbean Sea Emission Control Area under Regulations
13 and 14 and Appendix VII of MARPOL Annex VI, Res. MEPC.202(62) (July 15,
2011).
3
33 U.S.C. § 1908.
4
See U.S. DEP’T of TRANSP., VESSEL CALLS SNAPSHOT, 2011 (2013).
In 2011, foreign-flagged vessels accounted for 89% of calls at U.S. ports. The
number of U.S.-flagged vessels calling at U.S. ports had a range of 6,869 to 7,356
between 2006 and 2011. Id. at 8; see also Sandra Y. Snyder, EPA’s Category 3 Marine
Emission Standards: Mimicking MARPOL Annex VI or Mocking the Clean Air Act? 71
BROOK. L. REV. 1065, 1089 (2005) (most vessels entering U.S. ports are foreign
vessels).
2
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relevant Annex VI provisions. Section III leads a comparison of
Annex VI regulative schemes in the United States and a major marine
trade partner, China. The comparison concludes that the United
States and U.S. shipping companies are likely to bear unfair burdens
administratively and financially in enforcing this multi-national
convention due to the uneven regulative landscape globally. Having
examined, from an economic perspective, the factors that could
affect the effectiveness of enforcement measures, Section III
recommends using incentive programs as an interim solution to
solicit wider voluntary compliance while foreign countries such as
China are yet to give effect to Annex VI through domestic legislation.
Finally, Section IV discusses the feasibility of two main types of
potential market-based incentive programs, cap-and-trade and
emission credit trading, to provide non-complying foreign ships a
“last offer” to avoid criminal penalties for violation of Annex VI
while operating in U.S. waters. This paper favors an emission credit
trading program, considering the increasing demand of international
shipping service, in general, and the need to synergize technological
developments in the ship building industry with the regulatory
requirements of Annex VI.
I.

ANNEX VI ENFORCEMENT SCHEME FOR FOREIGN FLAGGED
VESSELS CALLING AT U.S. PORTS

Foreign flagged vessels, just as U.S. flagged vessels, are
regulated under the APPS when they operate in U.S. waters. Vessels
have to use low-sulfur fuels, the quality and quantity of which are
documented in Bunker Delivery Notes, and provide engine
certificates to prove compliance with Annex VI standards. Civil or
criminal liabilities may be imposed for violations. The U.S. Coast
Guard, under an agreement with the EPA, has the authority to
undertake onboard inspections.
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MARPOL Annex VI and Its Adoption in the United States

MARPOL,5 as modified by Protocol of 1978,6 is the main
international convention to prevent marine environment pollution
from ocean-going vessels.7 Annex VI of MARPOL sets limits for
NOx,8 SOx,9 and particulate matter (PM)10 emissions from ocean5
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
Nov. 2, 1973, 1973 U.S.T. Lexis 322, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 [hereinafter MARPOL
Annex VI].
6
Protocol of 1978, Feb. 17, 1978, 1978 U.S.T. Lexis 322, 1340
U.N.T.S. 61.
7
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL),
INT’L
MAR.
ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Internation
al-Convention-for-the-Prevention-of-Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx (last
visited Feb. 15, 2015).
8
NOx (Nitrogen Oxides) forms through the diesel engine combustion
process when the temperature reaches 2000 degrees Kelvin (equivalent to about
3140 Fahrenheit) and the nitrogen in the air reacts with oxygen. The amount of
NOx emission is not strongly affected by the specific fuel consumption, but is
dependent on the temperature, pressure, and duration of combustion time of the
engine fuel. Most nitrogen is oxidized into nitric oxide (NO) in the early stage of
combustion. Some of the NO will convert to nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and nitrous
oxide (N2O) during the later expansion process and in the exhaust. NO x is the
mixture of NO, NO2, and N2O. One way of measuring NOx emission is based on
the main engine’s rated speed, presented as revolutions per minute (rpm). See
LAURIE GOLDSWORTHY, DESIGN OF SHIP ENGINES FOR REDUCED EMISSIONS OF
OXIDES
OF
NITROGEN
§2
(2002),
available
at
http://www.flamemarine.com/files/AMCPaper.pdf. NOx emission is significantly
higher when an engine operates at lower rpm (50 to 550); Lasse Johansson,
Emission Estimation of Marine Traffic Using Vessel Characteristic and AIS-Data
19 (Sept. 19, 2011) (Master’s thesis, Aalto University), available at
www.lib.tkk.fi/Dipl/2011/ urn100529.pdf. NOx are precursor components for a
photochemical reaction through which ozone is formed, and catalysts for the
formation of acid rain. Id. at 5. Exposure to NOx, even if for a short term from 30
minutes to 24 hours, would adversely affect the human respiratory system,
including airway inflammation in healthy people and increased respiratory
symptoms in people with asthma. Nitrogen Dioxide, U.S. ENV’L PROT. AGENCY,
http://www. epa.gov/air/nitrogenoxides/health.html (last updated Feb. 14, 2013).
9
SOx is the mixture of SO2, SO3, and SO4. The amount of SOx
emission from vessels is directly related to the sulfur content of marine fuel burned.
See Johansson, supra note 8; Zoi Nikopoulou et al., The Role of A Cap-and-Trade
Market in Reducing NOx and SOx Emissions: Prospects and Benefits for Ships Within the
Northern European ECA, 227(2) J. ENG’G FOR THE MARINE ENV’T 136, 136 (2013).
Current world-wide average sulfur content in marine fuel is about 2.7% (27,000
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going vessels that are of 400 gross tonnages or more, and general
enforcement and monitoring procedures. 11 The International
Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations specialized agency
responsible for improving maritime safety and preventing pollution
from ships, administers the enforcement of Annex VI worldwide.12
Annex VI requires ratifying states to designate certain sea areas as
ECAs where “mandatory measures” are required to control the
emission of “NOx or SOx and [PM] or all three.” 13 These
“mandatory measures” include limiting the sulfur content of fuel oil
to reduce SOx and PM emissions through Regulation 14, 14 and
prescribing three “tiers” of design standards for marine diesel engines
ppm). DONALD DABDUB & SATISH VUTUKURU, AIR QUALITY IMPACTS OF SHIP
EMISSIONS IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN OF CALIFORNIA 2 (2008). SOx can
react with other compounds in the atmosphere to form small particles, which can
penetrate deeply into lungs and cause or worsen respiratory diseases. Sulfur Dioxide,
U.S.
ENV’L
PROT.
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/sulfurdioxide/health.html (last updated June 28,
2013). The SOx particles usually spread up to a few hundred kilometers depending
on weather and wind conditions. In the presence of catalysts such as NO x, SOx can
form H2SO4 causing acid rain. Johansson, supra note 8.
10
PM (Particulate Matter), measured by PM2.5 (diameters of the
particulates are less than 2.5 μm) and PM10 (diameters of the particulates are less
than 10 μm), is produced during combustion in the form of soot, ash, organic and
elemental carbon, SO4 and its associated water molecules. The amount of PM
emission from vessels is linearly dependent on the sulfur content of the fuel oil. See
Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 136-37; Johansson, supra note 8. PM contains
microscopic solids and liquid droplets small enough to get into the lungs and cause
a range of health problems to the lungs, respiratory systems, and heart. Particulate
Matter,
U.S.
ENV’L
PROT.
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/particlepollution/health.html (last updated Mar.
18, 2013).
11
See MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5.
12
See Introduction to IMO, ABOUT IMO, http://www.imo.org/
About/Pages/Default.aspx(last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
13
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 2, ¶ 8. Emissions of
NOx, SOx, and particulate matter from ocean-going vessels could cause adverse
impacts to the environment and public health, including premature mortality,
cardiopulmonary disease, lung cancer, chronic respiratory ailments, acidification
and eutrophication. Id., Appendix III Criteria and Procedures for Designation of
Emission Control Areas, ¶ 1.2.
14
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 14. In ECAs, upper
limits of the sulfur content of fuel oil used on board ships are 1.50% m/m before
July 1, 2010; 1.00% m/m on and after July 1, 2010; 0.10% m/m on and after Jan. 1,
2015. Id. ¶ 8.
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to control NOx emission through Regulation 13.15 Depending on
the vessel’s operational area and the time when the vessel engine is
installed, different levels of NOx emission standard apply: Tier I
standard applies to engines that are installed on a ship constructed
between 2000 and 2011;16 Tier II standard applies to engines that are
installed on ships constructed on or after January 2011, and if
operating outside ECAs, ships constructed on or after January 1,
2016;17 the most stringent Tier III standard applies to engines that
are installed on ships constructed on or after January 1, 2016 if such
ships operate in ECAs.18 Notably, at the 65th session meeting held in
May 2013, the IMO considered the proposal of delaying the
implementation of Tier III standards in ECAs until January 1, 2021.19
The IMO eventually made only a partial compromise. At the 66th
session meeting in 2014, the IMO decided to uphold the original
Considering the long service life of ocean-going vessels that may last
for decades, MARPOL Regulation 13 sets three “tiers” of NOx emission standards
for marine diesel engines that are installed on ships constructed between 2000 and
2011, after 2011, and after 2016. These emission limits are relative, presented in
formulas with the rated engine speed (rpm, revolutions per minute) as the variable.
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13.
16
For engines that are installed on ships constructed on or after
January 1, 2000 and before January 1, 2011, Tier I standard applies: NO x emission
shall be under 17.0 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is less than 130 rpm; under
45×n(-0.2) with “n” being the rated engine speed is between 130 rpm and 2,000 rpm;
under 9.8 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is above 2,000. MARPOL Annex
VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13, ¶ 3.
17
For engines that are installed on ships constructed on or after
January 1, 2011, and ships constructed on or after January 2016 and operate outside
ECAs, Tier II standard applies: NOx emission shall be under 14.4 g/kWh when the
rated engine speed is less than 130 rpm; under 44×n(-0.23) with “n” being the rated
engine speed is between 130 rpm and 2,000 rpm; under 7.7 g/kWh when the rated
engine speed is above 2,000. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13, ¶¶
4, 5.1.3.
18
Tier III standard applies to marine diesel engines that are installed
on ships constructed on or after Jan. 1, 2016 and operate within ECAs. NO x
emission from such ships shall be under 3.4 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is
less than 130 rpm; under 9×n(-0.2) with “n” being the rated engine speed is between
130 rpm and 2,000 rpm; under 2.0 g/kWh when the rated engine speed is above
2,000. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 13, ¶¶ 5.1.1, 5.1.2.
19
IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee 65th Session Pushes Forward
with Energy-Efficiency Implementation, INT’L MAR. ORG. NEWS BRIEFS (May 21, 2013),
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/18MEPC65ENDS.aspx.
15
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2016 deadline for Tier III NOx requirement for marine diesel engines
installed on new ships constructed on or after January 1, 2016, and
accept the proposed delay until 2021 for engines installed on large
yachts, viz. ships that are of less than 500 gross tonnage and 24
meters or more in length.20
Annex VI affords ratifying states with broad authority in
enforcement. But such authority is qualified when the violation is
caused by non-availability of low-sulfur fuels that are in compliance
with MARPOL standards. To ensure compliance by ships, regardless
of their country of registry, port states shall use “all appropriate and
practicable measures of detection and environmental monitoring,”
including inspection and bringing proceedings.21 Port states “shall
[also] take all reasonable steps” to provide low-sulfur fuel at ports
and terminals in their jurisdictions.22 If a ship furnishes evidence,
primarily through documentation, of good faith attempts to secure
compliant fuel yet no such fuel is available,23 the port state shall
consider “not taking control measures.”24 Importantly, Annex VI
explicitly provides that no deviation or delay of voyage should be
required in order to achieve compliance.25
The United States ratified Annex VI in 2008 26 and
implemented the mandatory air emission standards domestically
IMO, REPORT OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION
COMMITTEE ON ITS SIXTY-SIX SESSION MEPC 66/21, 36 (2014), available at
http://www.uscg.mil/imo/mepc/docs/MEPC66-report.pdf.
21
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 11, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4.
22
Id. Regulation 18, ¶ 1.
23
Id. ¶¶ 2.11, 2.12.
24
Id. ¶¶ 2.3, 2.5.
25
Id. ¶ 2.2.
26
Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments
in Respect of Which the International Maritime Organization or Its Secretary-General Performs
Depositary
or
Other
Functions
(2015),
available
at
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/
StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%202015.pdf.
Seventy
five
countries have ratified MARPOL Annex VI. Status of Conventions, INT’L MAR. ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/
About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx
(accessed by
clicking on the “excel chart listing ratifications by State”). Ratifying parties “shall
co-operate” in enforcement of the provisions of this Annex. MARPOL Annex VI,
supra note 5, Regulation 11, §1.
20

562

2015

Shi

4:1

through amendments made in 2008 to the APPS27 and the Clean Air
Act.28 Currently, two ECAs have been established covering virtually
all U.S. coastlines. The North American ECA came into force on
August 1, 2012, extending up to 200 nautical miles from the Pacific
coast, the Atlantic coast, the Gulf coast, and the eight Hawaiian
Islands.29 The United States Caribbean Sea ECA, covering coastal
waters around Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, was approved
by the IMO in 2011 and became enforceable starting January 1,
2014.30 Emissions of SOx, NOx, and PM are all regulated in both
ECAs.
B.

Enforcement Measures of MARPOL Annex VI on Foreign
Flagged Vessels Operating in U.S. Waters

MARPOL Annex VI affords no differentiated treatment of
foreign flagged vessels and U.S. flagged vessels. 31 The APPS
provides that Annex VI applies to all foreign flagged vessels “in” or
bound for “a port, shipyard, offshore terminal, or the internal waters
of the United States.”32

33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1915.
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2006).
29
IMO, North American Emission Control Area, Resolution MEPC.
190(60) (Mar. 26, 2010); OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION AND AIR QUALITY, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-420-F-10-015, DESIGNATION OF
NORTH AMERICAN EMISSION CONTROL AREA TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM
SHIPS
(2010),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/
otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/420f10015.pdf.
30
IMO, Designation of the United States Caribbean Sea Emission Control
Area and Exemption of Certain Ships Operation in the North American Emission Control
Area and the United States Caribbean Sea Emission Control Area under Regulations 13 and
14 and Appendix VII of MARPOL Annex VI, Resolution MEPC.202(62) (July 15,
2011); OFFICE OF TRANSPORTATION AND AIR QUALITY, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-420-F-11-024, DESIGNATION OF EMISSION
CONTROL AREA TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS IN THE U.S. CARIBBEAN
(2011)
31
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (MARPOL), Art. 5(4) (with respect to the ship of non-parties to the
convention, parties shall apply the requirements of the present convention as may
be necessary to ensure that no more favorable treatment is given to such ships).
32
33 U.S.C. § 1902 (5)(A), (B).
27
28
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Civil penalties would be imposed for failure to provide
documentation to prove compliance with Annex VI and each day of
non-compliance would be considered a separate violation.33 For noncompliant vessels, the U.S. EPA requires a corrective action plan
signed by the ship owner or operator, and would report the noncompliance to the ship’s country of registry.34 A class D felony is
committed if a ship owner or operator “knowingly violates” Annex
VI.35 Up to one half of the criminal fines may be paid to the “person
giving information leading to conviction.”36 The U.S. Coast Guard is
responsible for conducting ship inspections to verify compliance and
investigations to establish criminal liability.37
1. Enforcement of Regulation 14 for SOx and PM emissions. - To
comply with Regulation 14, ships must use low-sulfur fuel, 38 be
eligible for exemptions,39 or use “equivalents.”40 Because the price

33 U.S.C. § 1908 (2008); OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL VESSEL
COMPLIANCE (CG-CVC), U.S. COAST GUARD, ECA JOB AID: DOMESTIC &
FOREIGN VESSELS (2012).
34
OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL VESSEL COMPLIANCE (CG-CVC), U.S.
COAST GUARD, ECA JOB AID: DOMESTIC & FOREIGN VESSELS (2012).
35
33 U.S.C. § 1908, (a) (2008).
36
Id.
37
Memorandum of Understanding Between United States Coast
Guard and United States Environmental Protection Agency Regarding
Enforcement of Annex VI as Implemented by the Act to Prevent Pollution from
Ships, June 27, 2011, available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/documents/annexvi-mou062711.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
38
Regulation 14 of Annex VI specifies that ships operating within an
Emission Control Area shall use fuel oil with sulfur content lower than 1.00%
m/m on and after July 1, 2010, and lower than 0.10% m/m/ on and after January
1, 2015. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 14, ¶ 4. The term “lowsulfur fuel” in this paper is used broadly to include low-sulfur residual fuel, marine
diesel oil, and marine gas oil. See Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 141.
39
Regulation 3 of Annex VI provides that ships on trial for emission
control technology research could be exempted from certain Annex VI provisions
if compliance would impede the technology development. MARPOL Annex VI,
supra note 5, Regulation 3, ¶ 2. See, e.g., Anna Lee Deal, Liquefied Natural Gas as a
Marine Fuel: A closer look at TOTE’s Containership Projects 12 (Nat’l Energy Policy Inst.
Working
Paper,
May
7,
2013),
available
at
http://www.glmri.org/downloads/lngMisc/NEPI%20LNG%20as%20a%20Marin
e%20Fuel%205-7-13.pdf (TOTE obtained a waiver from the EPA and Coast
Guard allowing the company to operate its ships using distillate fuels above
33
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of low-sulfur fuels is much higher than that of standard fuels,41 a
common practice to achieve compliance without splurging on cleaner
fuel is to flush the fuel piping systems and fill the settling tanks with
low-sulfur fuel only when approaching an ECA.42 But fuel switching
is less straightforward than it seems. Changing fuels when the fuel
temperature is still very high causes loss of engine power.43 Hence,
vessels need to slow down when switching fuels to avoid
malfunction.44 Additionally, because the low viscosity of low-sulfur
fuel45 and the incompatibility of fuels46 when mixed harms diesel

regulative limit within the ECA during the conversion of these ships to liquefied
natural gas so as to provide savings for the expensive environmental project).
40
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 4, ¶ 1.
41
See THEO NOTTEBOOM ET AL., ANALYSIS OF THE CONSEQUENCES
OF LOW SULFUR FUEL REQUIREMENTS 16 (2010), available at www.schone
scheepvaart.nl/downloads/rapporten/doc_1361790123.pdf.
42
See DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), MARPOL 73/78 ANNEX VI
REGULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM SHIPS:
TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 17 (2009), available at
www.dnv.com/binaries/marpol%20brochure_tcm4-383718.pdf; Chengfeng Wang
et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Reducing Sulfur Emissions from Ships, 41 (24) ENV’T SCI.
TECH. 8233, 8234 (2007), available at http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/
10.1021/es070812w (switching from high-sulfur marine fuels with a sulfur content
of 2.7%, the worldwide average, to low-sulfur marine fuels with sulfur content not
exceeding 1.5% can reduce about 44% of SO2 emissions).
43
DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 42.
44
AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY
NOTICE
17
(2010),
available
at
http://www.eagle.org/eagleExternal
PortalWEB/ShowProperty/BEA%20Repository/References/ABS%20Advisories/
FuelSwitchingAdvisory (operational manual for fuel switching and training for staff
is necessary).
45
Main operational problems caused by the low viscosity of low-sulfur
fuel are the reduced effectiveness of the fuel as a lubricant, loss of capacity in fuel
supply and circulation pumps, and increased chances of leakage of fuel through the
fuel pump barrel and plunger, and suction and spill valve push rods, and less energy
generated per volume of fuel. AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING
ADVISORY NOTICE 9, 10(2010).
46
Incompatibility between different fuels would result in excessive
sedimentation, sludging, and separator and filter problems. Hence, an additional set
of fuel supply systems may be necessary. DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note
42.
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engines and boilers, modifications to the fuel system are often
necessary.47
Annex VI encourages technological innovation by affording
flexibilities in achieving compliance. Under Regulation 4, port states
can allow “any fitting, material, appliance or apparatus . . . or other
procedures, alternative fuel oils, or compliance methods” so long as
such alternatives are as effective in terms of emission reductions as
the measures provided by Annex VI.48 If obtaining low-sulfur fuel is
difficult, installing desulfurization units to achieve compliance is also
technically feasible and permissible under MARPOL Annex VI. 49
But the high cost of such exhaust gas cleaning systems make this
alternative unattractive.50 Even if the cost of a desulfurization unit
itself is justified, its installment would probably require re-designing
the fuel system due to the limited space in the engine room, and
therefore lead to additional investments in vessel retrofitting. 51
Another rapidly developing technology,52 because of the heightened
environmental standards driven by MARPOL Annex VI, is using
47
See AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY
NOTICE 11-14 (2010) (modifications that may be needed include installing
separate purifier and piping system for the low-sulfur fuels, additional fuel coolers
if the vessel operates in summer and tropical conditions, special fuel injection
pumps); DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 42 (ship owners may consider
upgrading the capacity of diesel tanks, or installing an additional set of service
and settling tanks for low sulfur fuels).
48
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 4, ¶ 1.
49
AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY
NOTICE 7 (2010); DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), MARPOL 73/78 ANNEX VI
REGULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM SHIPS:
TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 16 (2009) (exhaust gas cleaning
alternatives will also reduce PM emissions); see Chengfeng Wang et al., supra note
42, at 8234.
50
DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 49 (further technological
developments or legislation are needed to lower the installation costs of a
desulfurization unit, which is about $1 million (USD) to $2 million (USD), to make
this alternative cost-beneficial).
51
See AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING, FUEL SWITCHING ADVISORY
NOTICE 12 (2010); DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 49, at 17-18.
52
See, e.g., Bridget C. Brett, Potential Market for LNG-Fueled Marine
Vessels in the United States 34 (June 2008) (Master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/44920#files-area
(the four main manufactures who have the technology for LNG-fueled vessels are
Rolls-Royce, GE, Wärtsilä, and MAN Diesel).
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Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) as a marine fuel. 53 The costeffectiveness of conversion to LNG varies from vessel to vessel, and
is affected, primarily, by three factors: (1) the amount of time the
vessel operates in an ECA; (2) LNG tanker size relative to the vessel
size; and (3) LNG fuel availability.54
However, Regulation 4 leaves the gap of identifying
“equivalents,” i.e., alternative compliant measures, to the port states
to fill in through bilateral negotiations. Currently, the United States
requires foreign port states to submit to the U.S. Coast Guard
proposals of equivalents for compliance. 55 The United States is
seeking IMO’s coordination in identifying equivalents56 to minimize
the need for enforcement actions if the U.S. Government disagrees
with the equivalents approved by other port states.57 Absent IMO’s
Natural gas is a type of fossil fuel consisting mainly of methane
(CH4). Id. Gaseous Natural gas transforms into liquid, called Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG), when the natural gas is cooled to -162 Celsius degrees. LNG creates the
economics of scale by saving 99% of the space that natural gas with the same
energy content in gaseous form would take. Id. at 15-16. NLG is considered the
cleanest form of fuel because it contains no sulfur and thus all SO x emissions and
most PM emissions are eliminated. Because LNG burns at lower temperatures than
standard fuels, NOx emissions are also reduced significantly. Johansson, supra note
8. The use of LNG as marine fuel became economically attractive when natural gas
became cheaper than residual oil in early 2006. Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at
143. But the cost of LNG-fueled systems is generally 12% higher than the capital
investment for a standard diesel engine. Bridget C. Brett, supra note 52, at 57.
54
Anna Lee Deal, supra note 39, at 12 (LNG facilities are being
planned for Cameron Parish and Port Fourchon in Los Angeles, along the
Mississippi River, and in the Great Lakes region).
55
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 16711/CG-CVC Policy Letter,
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMISSION CONTROL
AREAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES JURISDICTION AS DESIGNATED
IN MARPOL ANNEX VI REGULATION 14 (2012), § 5b(ii).
56
See Letter from Jeffrey G. Lantz, Dir., Commercial Regulations and
Standards, U.S. Coast Guard, and Margo Tsirigotis Oge, Dir., Office of Transp.
and Air Quality, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Koji Sekimizu, Secretary-General of
Int’l
Mar.
Org.
(Mar.
12,
2012),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/letter-epa-and-uscg-toimo.pdf.
57
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 16711/CG-CVC Policy Letter,
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMISSION CONTROL
AREAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES JURISDICTION AS DESIGNATED
IN MARPOL ANNEX VI REGULATION 14 (2012), § 5b(ii).
53
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intervention, countries such as the United States, which are enforcing
Annex VI in advance of the other countries, might have to act as the
de facto global administrator of Annex VI.
The Bunker Delivery Note, where the quality and quantity of
fuel oil supplied to vessels for combustion purposes is documented,58
serves as the main evidentiary source for verifying compliance with
Regulation 14. If the sulfur content of fuel oil exceeds Annex VI
limits, 59 and no exemption or equivalents apply, the ship owner
should provide documentation to prove that best efforts were made
to procure compliant fuel oil and notify the EPA of the nonavailability of such fuel oil before entering the ECA. 60 Taking
together the regulative requirements and available technologies,
owners of ships registered in countries where Annex VI is not fully
enforced or no equivalents under Regulation 4 are formally
established would probably have no choice but to change voyage
plans, with the hope61 of avoiding criminal charges in the United
States.
2. Enforcement of Regulation 13 for NOx emissions. - The
reduction of NOx emissions is a function of multiple factors,
including: engine design, engine age, fuel type, operational mode,
energy efficiency,62 and any add-on emission reduction equipment.63
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 18, ¶ 6.
Id. Regulation 14, ¶ 4.
60
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON THE NONAVAILABILITY OF COMPLIANT FUEL OIL FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN EMISSION
CONTROL AREA (2012), 3-4; OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL VESSEL COMPLIANCE (CGCVC), U.S. COAST GUARD, ECA JOB AID: DOMESTIC & FOREIGN VESSELS (2012),
§ 3.
61
Evidence of good-faith attempt to secure low-sulfur fuel as required
by Annex VI is only relevant in EPA’s determination of the appropriate
administrative actions, but does not necessarily remove the possibility of finding
criminal liability. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 60, at 4-5.
62
NOx emission is actually a side effect of engine designs that aim to
enhance energy efficiency by maximizing the completeness of fuel combustion, i.e.,
increasing the pressure and temperature of combustion process. PER KÅGESON,
MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS FOR NOX ABATEMENT IN THE BALTIC SEA 10
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cleanshipping.org/download/2009_11_nox_report_baltic_sea.pdf
(Air Pollution and Climate Series 24, the European Environmental Bureau and the
European Federation for Transport and Environment).
58
59
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To a certain extent, the level of compliance with the NOx emission
standards of Annex VI reflects the sophistication of technological
research and development in the shipbuilding industry. 64 The
See DAVID COOPER & TOMAS GUSTAFSSON, METHODOLOGY FOR
CALCULATING EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS: 1. UPDATE OF EMISSION FACTORS 13-15
(2004). The technical issues involved in restricting engine design to minimize air
emissions are complex not only because the engine design has to fit various ship
configurations but also because of safety concerns as ships must be able to depend
on their sources of power in tough weather conditions and navigational hazards. See
generally Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Supplementary Information to the Final Report of the
Correspondence Group on Assessment of Technological Developments to Implement the Tier III
NOx Emission Standards under MARPOL Annex VI, MEPC 65/INF. 10 (Feb. 8,
2013) (countries including the United States, Finland, Japan, Germany, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom reviewing technology developments to achieve Tier III
standards for NOx emission that is to be in force in 2016).
64
Several technically feasible means exist to achieve the relative
standards for NOx emission under Annex VI. For low-speed two-stroke engines,
compliance can be achieved through replacing conventional fuel valves by lowNOx slide valves. For other engines, compliance is achieved through more complex
engine modifications, including miller cycling, which achieves a lower temperature
in the combustion chamber without a loss in power output; direct water injection,
which rebuilds the engine to enable fresh water being sprayed into the combustion
air to remove NOx from the exhaust gas; exhaust gas recirculation, where exhaust
gases are filtered, cooled, and redirected into the engine to reduce the combustion
temperature; selective catalytic reduction, a commercialized catalytic exhaust
treatment system that is applicable to both new vessels and retrofit installations;
humid air motor, which prevents NOx formation during combustion by adding
water vapor to the engine’s combustion air; and low-NOx engines, which employs
techniques to control fuel injection, spray formation, and fuel-air mixture to reduce
temperature throughout the combustion process. See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at
10-13 (Air Pollution and Climate Series 24, the European Environmental Bureau
and the European Federation for Transport and Environment); Seita Akimoto et
al., Techniques for Low NOx Combustion on Medium Speed Diesel Engine, 2(1) BULLETIN
OF
THE
MECH. ENG’G SCIENTIFIC J., 8 (2000), available at
http://www.jime.jp/e/publication/ bulletin/english/pdf/mv28n012000p08.pdf;
KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 10 (Air Pollution and Climate Series 24, the European
Environmental Bureau and the European Federation for Transport and
Environment). Tier I and II standards of Annex VI, Regulation 13 are achievable
with relatively simple engine modifications. See Johansson, supra note 8, at 20 (some
engine manufactures have already been producing Tier II compliant engines for the
last decade). The international shipbuilding industry is more concerned with the
compliance with the Tier III standards. See Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Supplementary
Information to the Final Report of the Correspondence Group on Assessment of Technological
Developments to Implement the Tier III NOx Emission Standards under MARPOL Annex
VI, MEPC 65/INF. 10 (Feb. 8, 2013). Currently, only three technologies could
63
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primary evidentiary source for verifying compliance is the
International Air Pollution Prevention Certificate,65 which should be
issued to individual engines based on emission tests on the engine
manufacturer’s test bed. 66 Therefore, although ship owners or
operators seem to be the directly affected parties, the underlying
rationale of Regulation 13 is to urge manufacturers to design vessels
that meet higher emission standards by creating market demand from
the ship owners and operators.
In 2010, the EPA published a rule to regulate NOx emissions
from new Category 3 engines with the same level of stringency as
Annex VI, Regulation 13.67 The EPA rule applies to Category 3
engines installed on U.S. vessels only.68 The regulated parties are
mainly the manufacturers of Category 3 marine diesel engines, 69
most of which are incorporated in Finland, Germany, and Japan.70
The U.S. vessel manufacturing industry is affected only to the extent
that domestic vessel manufacturers have to adapt vessel designs and
manufacturing processes to the new engine designs.71

meet Tier III standards: selective catalytic reduction, humid air motor, and liquefied
natural gas engine. Jerzy Herdzik, Emissions from Marine Engines Versus IMO
Certification and Requirements of Tier 3, 18 J. KONES POWERTRAIN & TRANS. 161,
165-66 (2011) (IMO’s Tier III standards would require sharp increase in the
development of new control systems adapted to the operation of compliant marine
engines).
65
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 1, ¶ 1; MARPOL
Regulation 13, ¶ 7.3; MARPOL Appendix I, Form of International Air Pollution
Prevention (IAPP) Certificate (Regulation 8).
66
DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV), supra note 49, at 9 (later onboard
verification procedures are initially decided by the engine manufacturer).
67
Category 3 engines refer to compression-ignition engines at or
above 30 liters per cylinder. See 40 C.F.R. § 94, 1042 (2010).
68
40 C.F.R. § 94.1 (b)(2). See also Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d
404, 412-13 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding the EPA’s decision not to regulate
Category 3 on foreign-flagged vessels because of particular deference to agency
decision under the Clean Air Act).
69
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS:
CONTROL OF EMISSION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM CATEGORY 3 MARINE DIESEL
ENGINES (2009), pt. 1 at 5-6, pt. 8 at 3.
70
Id.
71
Id.
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For foreign vessels, the NOx emissions are instead controlled
directly through implementing ECAs.72 Hence, the compliance of
foreign vessels with NOx emission standards relies largely on whether
their countries of registry have given effect to Annex VI through
legislation. The U.S. EPA plays only a secondary role in the sense
that it has no direct control over the upstream regulatory necessities,
viz., engine designs of the vessels that are registered and
manufactured in foreign countries. As such, an “administrative
vacuum” exists in enforcing Regulation 13 on foreign vessels.73
II.

CHALLENGES OF ENFORCING ANNEX VI: AN UNEVEN
GLOBAL REGULATIVE LANDSCAPE

In the United States, APPS sets a rather low threshold for
finding criminal liability, risking the efficiency and economy of the
administrative enforcement process. In most foreign countries that
are major maritime trading partners with the United States, however,
Annex VI has not been fully enforced. The disparity between the
compliance environments at calling ports in different countries needs
to be addressed to minimize the enforcement cost borne by the
United States in implementing Annex VI.
A.

“Knowing Violation” as the Legal Threshold for Finding
Criminal Liability

The owner or other parties involved in a non-compliant
foreign flagged vessel who “knowingly violates” MARPOL would be
criminally charged. 74 But APPS provides no other language to
substantiate the threshold of “knowing violation.” The EPA
guidelines indicate indirectly that criminal liability could be found if
the ship has previously reported non-availability of compliant fuel oil,
or if insufficient quantity of compliant fuel oil is obtained at U.S.
ports even though the ship operator knows that the vessel will return

40 C.F.R., Summary III, A.
See generally Snyder, supra note 4, at 1072-80 (criticizing EPA’s
Category 3 rule as inadequate for not extending to foreign vessels).
74
33 U.S.C. § 1908 (a) (2008).
72

73
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to the ECA and complaint fuel oil is unavailable outside the ECA. 75
The EPA also refuses to consider the cost of compliant fuel oil as a
relevant factor to establish “unavailability.”76
Recent cases regarding enforcement of MARPOL on foreign
vessels indicate that federal courts are unlikely to limit finding
criminal liability, especially when the violation is caused by an
affirmative action, as opposed to omissions. In United States v. Pena,
the court confirmed the conviction of a surveyor of an institute
organized in Florida for failing to conduct the required survey under
MARPOL Annex I of a Panamanian-flagged vessel. 77 The court
found “knowing violation” was established when the non-compliant
performance of the ship had been in place for months and the
defendant surveyor did not test the parts of the ship that he knew
were not functional.78
MARPOL Annex I was enforced in a more aggressive
manner in United States v. Sanford Ltd. 79 Defendant Sanford is a
fishing company incorporated in New Zealand and transports cargo
to U.S ports on a regular basis. Sanford was charged, inter alia, for not
recording discharges of oily bilge water in the vessel’s Oil Record
Book (ORB), even though such omission occurred in the high seas
before entering U.S. water and would not necessarily result in
criminal liability under the MARPOL enforcement regulations in
New Zealand.80 The court upheld the conviction on two grounds.
First, although finding APPS does not intend to apply
extraterritorially, the court reasoned that the triggering point of the
violation is “at the moment a vessel enters a U.S. port with an
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON THE
NON-AVAILABILITY OF COMPLIANT FUEL OIL FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN
EMISSION CONTROL AREA (2012), at 8.
76
Id. at 5.
77
United States v. Pena, 684 F.3d 1137, 1143-44 (11th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 573 (2013) (upholding U.S. jurisdiction over foreign
flagged vessels).
78
Pena, 684 F.3d, 1152-53.
79
United States v. Sanford Ltd., 880 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11 (D.C. 2012)
(finding that the law-of-the-flag doctrine does not bar the U.S. Government from
prosecuting defendants for their violations of MARPOL implemented by the Act
to Prevent Pollution from Ships).
80
Id. at 12.
75
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inaccurate ORB” rather than when the omission occurred.81 Second,
the court held that the defense of being subjected unfairly to the
peculiar rules of a foreign sovereign does not prevail when the U.S.
and foreign regulations for implementing MARPOL are “on their
face . . . functionally identical.”82 However, the court narrowed this
holding to cases where the regulations of the United States and the
foreign country are unlikely to be in conflict.83 The court noted
implicitly that a “balancing of the delicate and important interests of
comity and sovereignty” might be needed in some cases.84
In a similar case, United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A.,85 defendant
Ionia, incorporated in Liberia and headquartered in Greece, was
convicted for making false entries in the ORB to conceal illegal
discharges of oily wastewater and obstructing a federal investigation.
The court upheld the order of forty-eight months of probation, a
corrective ship management plan, and a fine of $4.9 million (USD).86
The court held that the amount of the criminal fine, although not
calculated based on the sentencing guidelines, was nevertheless
reasonable given the culpability of the violation.87 The sentencing
was enforced through several hearings during the subsequent three
years.88
B.

Enforcement of Annex VI Outside the United States: China
as an Example

Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 21-23 (finding the discrepancies as to the interpretation of
“machinery space” insufficient to support a finding of material difference between
the U.S. and New Zealand regulations).
83
Sanford Ltd., 880 F. Supp. 2d, 22.
84
Id.
85
United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 2009).
86
Id. at 310.
87
Id.
88
See United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA), 2011
WL 5304117 (D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2011); United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07CR-134 (JBA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126089 (D. Conn. Oct. 28, 2011); United
States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87122
(D. Conn. Aug. 3, 2011); United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134
(JBA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996 (C. Conn. Feb. 9, 2011); United States v. Ionia
Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134 (JBA), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109063 (D. Conn.
Oct. 11, 2010); United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., No. 3:07-CR-134(JBA), 2009
WL 3074727 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2009).
81
82
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The benefits of implementing Annex VI will be fully realized
only when both U.S. and foreign vessels actually operate under the
same environmental standards.89 Not all countries, however, perceive
air emissions from marine vessels as a significant pollution source as
the United States does.90 A review of regulations and policies on air
pollution control in China, an example of one of the largest
waterborne trading partners with the United States, 91 shows that
such foreign countries are unlikely to enact legislation in the near
term to implement Annex VI as stringently as the United States.
China has not enacted particular laws or regulations to
implement Annex VI,92 and will not do so, at least, until after 2015.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 69, pt. 6 at 1.
Although the prioritization of sectors targeted in a country’s air
pollution control strategy is not always “objective,” numbers do found a persuasive
basis. In the United States, the transport sector contributes to about 54% of total
NOx emissions. ANDREW AULISI ET AL., GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING
IN U.S. STATES: OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS FROM THE OZONE TRANSPORT
COMMISSION (OTC) NOX BUDGET PROGRAM 3 (Margaret B. Yamashita ed., World
Resources Institute, 2005), available at http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/
nox_ghg.pdf (estimation based on inventory data released in EPA reports
reviewing the performance of OTC NOx Budget Program); see also The 2011
National Emissions Inventory, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (last updated on Dec. 24,
2013), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/net/2011 inventory.html (emission sources
from transport sector contributes about 62% to the total NO x emissions from fuel
combustion, gas stations, industrial processes, and road and non-road mobile
sources). In other countries, the transport sector may contribute less to the total air
pollutant emission by percentage than that in the United States due to the
differences in industrial structure. In China, for example, the transport sector
contributes only about 9% to the total NOx emissions in 2005. J. Xing et al.,
Projections of Air Pollutant Emissions and Its Impacts on Regional Air Quality in China in
2020, 11 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICS 3119, 3129 (2011), available at
http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/11/3119/2011/acp-11-3119-2011.html.
The
major source of NOx emissions is instead power plants. Id. at 3128.
91
The waterborne container trade between China and the United
States was at 29,477,025 TEUs in 2012. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., U.S. Waterborne
Foreign Container Trade by Trading Partners (Sept 26, 2013), http://www.
marad.dot.gov/library_landing_page/data_and_statistics/Data_and_Statistics.htm
(last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
92
China ratified MARPOL Annex VI in 2010. Status of Conventions,
INT’L
MAR.
ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/About/
Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx (last updated Sept. 30,
2012). Ratifying parties “shall co-operate” in enforcement the provisions of this
Annex. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 11, ¶1.
89
90
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Only a set of quasi-regulative rules promulgated by the Ministry of
Transport in 2010 requires that ships should hold certificates issued
by the Marine Administration in accordance with international
treaties that the Chinese government entered into or ratified. 93
However, this 2010 rule does not make reference to MARPOL
Annex VI or specify what certificates the ships should hold. 94
Provisions of the 2010 rule are so generally stated that its on-theground enforcement cannot be realized until the adoption of more
specific regulations or plans.95
Moreover, the approach employed by Chinese policies is
rather different from the MARPOL approach to control air emission
from waterborne transport. Once the numbers of national emission
caps and energy saving objectives are established96 for every five-year
planning period, 97 the air pollution control policies for different
sectors and sub-sectors are essentially allocations of the national
goal.98 Hence, air emissions from the marine transport sector are
Zhonghua renming gongheguo chuanbo jiqi youguan zuoye
huodong wuran haiyang huanjing fangzhi guanli guiding (中华人民共和国船舶及
其有关作业活动污染海洋环境防治管理规定) [Management Provisions on
Preventing Pollution of Marine Environment from Ships and Related Activities of
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Ministry of Transport, Oct. 8,
2010, effective Feb. 1, 2011), art. 1, 5, http://www.gov.cn/flfg/201012/02/content _1758149.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
94
Id.
95
See Nengye Liu & Frank Maes, Prevention of Vessel-Source Marine
Pollution: A Note on the Challenges and Prospects for Chinese Practice under International Law,
42 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L LAW 356, 358-59 (2011), available at
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00908320.2011.619373
.Usf9sRr8U5s.
96
See Guowuyuan guanyu yingfa shi’erwu jieneng jianpai zonghexing
gongzuo fang’an de tongzhi (国务院关于印发”十二五”节能减排综合性工作方
案的通知) [State Council’s Notification on Promulgating the Integrated Work Plan
for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction for the Twelfth Five Year]
(promulgated by the State Council Aug. 31, 2011, No. 26), available at
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-09/07/content_1941731.htm.
97
See The First Ten Five-Year Plans of the People’s Republic of China, THE
CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Mar. 20, 2006),
http://www.gov.cn/test/ 2006-03/20/content_231421.htm.
98
See Andrew C. Mertha, China’s “Soft” Centralization: Shipfting
Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations, 184 CHINA QUARTERLY 791, 796-800 (2005), available
at http://falcon.arts. cornell.edu/am847/pdf/Soft%20Centralization%20Final.pdf;
see also Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development,
93
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regulated based on the total amount of emissions for specified
pollutants and reduction in energy consumption, rather than
prescribing standards for marine fuels and diesel engines as
MARPOL Annex VI does.99 Currently, China is in the twelfth fiveyear planning period, which runs from 2011 until 2015. 100 The
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction,
one of the master national policies for this planning period, sets a
target of reducing energy consumption of vessels for marine and
inland waterway transportation by 10% to 6.29 kilograms of coal
equivalent per ton of goods per 1,000 kilometers by 2015.101

49(4) J. ECON. LITERATURE 1076, 1082-84, 1086-92 (2011), available at
www.sef.hku.hk/~cgxu/04_Xu.pdf (the functioning of Chinese government is not
a mixture of de facto federal state and a centralized regime: regional
decentralization exists as to economic governance, while other political and policy
decision-making processes follows closer to an authoritarian regime).
99
See Jiakuai tuijin luse xunhuan ditan jiaotong yunshu fazhan zhidao
yijian (加快推进绿色循环低碳交通运输发展指导意见) [Guiding Principles on
Promoting Green Low-Carbon Transport Development] (promulgated by the
Ministry of Transport, No. 323, May 22, 2013) (“Guiding principles (zhidao yijian)” are
less rigid policies than “Opinions (yijian).”), available at Ministry of Transport website:
http://www.moc.gov.cn/2006/jiaotongjj/07jiaotjnw/wenjiangg/201305/t2013052
7_1417741.html;(2013年运输行业节能减排工作要点) [Key Tasks for Energy
Saving and Emission Reduction in 2013 in Transport Sector] (promulgated by the
Ministry of Transport, No. 37, Jan. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.moc.gov.cn/2006/jiaotongjj/
07jiaotjnw/wenjiangg/201301/t20130118_1356606.html; Gonglu shuilu jiaotong
yunshu jieneng jianpai shi’erwu guihua (公路水路交通运输节能减排”十二五”规
划) [The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction in
Road and Water Transportation] (promulgated by the Ministry of Transport, July 8,
2011),
available
at
http://www.moc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/zhengcejiedu/guihuajiedu/shierwuguihuaJD/xi
angguanzhengcefagui/201110/t20111010_1064457.html.
100
See Guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shierge wunian guihua
gangyao (国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要) [The Outline of the
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development] (promulgated by
the State Council, Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://www.gov.cn/
2011lh/content_1825838_2.htm.
101
Jieneng jianpai shi’erwu guihua (节能减排”十二五”规划) [The
Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction] (promulgated
by the State Council, No. 40, Aug. 6, 2012), Table 1, available at
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2012/content_2217291.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2013).
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Subsequently, the Ministry of Transport (MoT) announced in
the sector’s leading policy102 that building green ports would be a
major task during the twelfth five-year planning period. This “green
port” policy trickles down to retrofitting port infrastructures to use
alternative powers in place of diesel fuel, including upgrading rubbertired gantry to use electricity instead of fuel,103 scaling up the use of
shorepower and solar power at ports, and establishing automatic
management systems to monitor energy consumption on vessels.104
Government funding for such projects generally shall be no more
than ¥10 million (RMB), according to the Temporary Management
Measures for Special Funding for Energy Saving and Emission
Reduction Projects in the Transport Sector issued jointly by the
MOT and the Ministry of Finance.105

Gonglu shuilu jiaotong yunshu jieneng jianpai shi’erwu guihua (公
路水路交通运输节能减排”十二五”规划) [The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for
Energy Saving and Emission Reduction in Road and Water Transportation]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Transport, July 8, 2011), section 4, sub-section 7,
available
at
http://www.moc.gov.cn/zhuzhan/
zhengcejiedu/guihuajiedu/shierwuguihuaJD/xiangguanzhengcefagui/201110/t201
11010_1064457.html (last visited Oct 22, 2013)
103
Rubber-tiered gantry (RTG), also called transtainer, is a mobile
gantry crane used for stacking containers at container terminals. Diesel rubber-tired
gantry (RTG) can represent a large percentage of a port’s total fuel consumption.
Electricity-powered RTGs offer a promising alternative in face of the increasing
price of diesel fuel and more stringent ambient air standards. The cost of
converting a diesel RTG to an electric cable reel connected one is approximately
$250,000. The effectiveness of such fuel-to-electricity conversion depends primarily
on the availability of electrical infrastructures connecting to the port, the remaining
service life of the RTG, and how much the RTG is used. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH
INST., ELECTRIC CABLE REEL RUBBER-TIRED GANTRY CRANES: COSTS AND
BENEFITS
1,
4
(2010),
available
at
http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspx?ProductId=0000000
00001020646.
104
Id.
105
Jiaotong yunshu jieneng jianpai zhuanxiang zijin guanli zhanxing
banfa (交通运输节能减排专项资金管理暂行办法) [Temporary Management
Measures for Special Funding for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction Projects
in the Transport Sector] (issued by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of
Transport, No. 374, June 20, 2011), chapter 2, art. 7, available at
http://jjs.mof.gov.cn/
zhengwuxinxi/tongzhigonggao/201107/t20110704_570700.html.
102
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Recently, the Chinese government heightened the sulfur
content standard for marine fuel oils. Under the new standard, the
maximum sulfur content of fuel oils shall be 3.5% m/m,106 which
comports with Regulation 14 of Annex VI for ships operating
outside ECAs.107 Thus, even if all ships registered in China use fuel
oils with less than 3.5% m/m sulfur content, many of them would
still fail the U.S. standard since virtually all U.S. waters are in ECAs,
where the sulfur content of fuel oils should be less than 1.00% m/m
starting from July 1, 2010108 and 0.10% m/m starting from 2015.109
The above review of policies and regulations shows that
marine vessels have not moved to the top of the air-cleaning agenda
of the Chinese government. 110 Any further legislation or
policymaking to give effect to the terms of MARPOL Annex VI in
China would probably only take place during the next planning
period at the earliest, viz., after 2015. Given this timing, China would
have to implement the most stringent emission standards provided in
Regulation 13 and 14 by the implementation schedule specified in
Annex VI to be comparable with U.S. standards.111
C.

Deficiencies of the Current Enforcement Mechanism

1. Deficiencies on a global scale. - A compliance environment
that exposes foreign ships with rotating crews, trading at different
ports where the stringency of a treaty is approached differently, poses
106
Chuanyong ranliaoyou (船用燃料油) [Marine Fuel Oil Standard]
(issued by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine, Standardization Administration, GB/T 17411-2012, July 1, 2013).
107
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 14, ¶1.2.
108
Id. ¶ 4.2.
109
Id. ¶ 4.3.
110
See also Qiang Zhang et al., Cleaning China’s Air, 484 NATURE 161,
161-62 (2012) (curbing emissions from power plants and coal consumption in
general remains the priority for tackling air emission for China given the country’s
continued rapid economic growth, even though tremendous governmental efforts
have been made to raise the operational standards for coal-fired power plants).
111
Recall that starting from January 1, 2015, the sulfur content of fuel
oil used on board ships shall be less than 0.10% m/m and Tier III standard for
NOx emission would start to apply in ECAs for engines installed on ships that are
constructed on or after January 1, 2016. MARPOL Regulation 13, ¶ 5.1.2;
MARPOL Regulation 14, ¶ 4.3. Again, MARPOL needs to be cited to earlier (see
earlier notes) or if this is MARPOL VI it needs to be cited as such.
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a daunting management challenge. 112 The uneven enforcement
landscape for MARPOL Annex VI is the quintessence of a
“prisoner’s dilemma” situation 113 for which international
environmental conventions that are not self-executing are often
criticized.114 If ratifying countries do not take enforcement measures
of similar stringency, 115 some countries could obtain economic
112
See, e.g., Claudia Copeland, Cruise Ship Pollution: Background, Laws and
Regulations, and Key Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 26 (2010),
http://www. eoearth.org/view/article/51dac6ac5948612528000716/ (the General
Accounting Office found that the process for referring cruise ship violations to
other countries does not appear to be working and recommended that the IMO
encourage member countries to respond when pollution cases are referred to
them).
113
The Prisoner’s Dilemma was initially developed by Merrill Flood
and Melvin Dresher in 2950, later named by A.W. Tucker. Paul W. Grimm &
Heather Leigh Williams, The Judicial Beatings Will Continue Until Moral Improves: The
Prisoner’s Dilemma of Cooperative Discovery and Proposals for Improved Morale, 43 U. BALT.
L.F. 107, 108-09 (2013) [hereinafter Grimm & Williams, Judicial Beatings] (citing to
Robert Axelrod’s book “The Evolution of Cooperation”). The Prisoner’s Dilemma
is one of the models in the game theory trying to explain how self-interested,
rational individuals interact in a collective decision-making process. MARTIN J.
OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 15-18 (1994). It
involves a scenario where two prisoners, retained separately under interrogation,
must decide whether to keep silent or to confess. Grimm & Williams, Judicial
Beatings, 43 U. BALT. L.F. 107, 108 (2013). Under the theoretical model of
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the rationality exercised by individuals for their best interests,
instead of leading to a scenario where all individuals’ interests are maximized,
instead tends to lead to inefficient resource allocation, suboptimal environmental
standards, and hence harms the overall welfare of the group of individuals. See
Kirsten H. Engle, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To
the Bottom”? 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 275-76 (1997).
114
See ROSS A. KLEIN, GETTING A GRIP ON CRUISE SHIP POLLUTION,
FRIENDS
OF
THE
EARTH,
17-28
(2009),
http://www.foe.org/sites/default/files/CruiseShipReport_Klein.pdf
(criticizing
MARPOL for not being self-executing resulting in its low on-the-ground
effectiveness); John Charles Kunich, Fiddling Around While the Hotspots Burn Out, 14
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 191 (2001) (the Convention on Biological
Diversity is another example where the Convention carries no real consequences
for those ratifying countries which take no action, such as domestic legislation, to
enforce the terms of this international agreement).
115
See Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization
of Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV. INT’L L.J. 421, 429 (1989) (country has
incentive to develop a competitive advantage in industrial production by enjoying
the benefits of the other countries’ environmental protection activities, while taking
limited action at home country).
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advantages by holding to more relaxed environmental standards
intentionally. 116 This “race to the bottom” phenomenon, or
“reluctance to move to the top” phenomenon, in response to
regulations on maritime safety and pollution has already been
observed in the international shipping industry.117 Therefore, if landbased transport routes are available to replace certain sections of
marine transport routes, the business interests of U.S. ports would
likely be adversely affected by the heightened environmental
standards, which often implicate increased operational cost for
shipping.118

116
See Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability:
Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 67, 80-82 (1996) (states respond to the interstate competition for
industry by lowering regulatory standards forming a “race to the bottom”
phenomenon, which might be remedied by promulgating federal laws); but see
Karen Palmer et al., Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost
Paradigm, 9(4) J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 129-30 (1995) (arguing generally that no clear
evidence to establish the conclusion that higher environmental regulation in the
United States has a large adverse effect on economic competitiveness on U.S.
firms, especially considering that the stringency of U.S. environmental regulations is
actually similar to that of European regulations).
117
Alan Khee-Jin Tan, VESSEL-SOURCE MARINE POLLUTION: THE
LAW AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 7 (James Crawford & John
S. Bell eds., 1st ed. 2006) (whenever any actor in the shipping industry tries to
maintain safety and pollution prevention standards, he is faced with the prospect of
losing business to cheaper standards; as a result, the proliferation of new rules and
regulations confers a competitive advantage on sub-standard operators). But the
other countries disadvantaged by the “race to the bottom” might push legislation to
raise the environmental standard globally, when their firms already developed or
have the capacity to develop the advanced manufacturing technologies to achieve
such higher standards, to turn themselves back to the leadership in the industry. See
RIMA MICKEVICIENE, THE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBALIZATION 202, 216
(Piotr Pachura eds. 1st ed. 2011) (a large part of technical innovations in the
shipbuilding industry has to be presented in relation to the goal of reducing exhaust
gas emissions).
118
See Erin Tanimura, Pacific Merchant II’s Dormant Commerce Clause
Ruling: Expanding State Control over Commerce Through Environmental Regulation, 47 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 419, 421-26 (2013) (arguing that the court’s ruling in favor of
California’s more stringent air emission standards on ships would disadvantage
business and commercial interests as these standards would increase the operational
cost by $30,000 (USD) per call); Harilaos N. Psaraftis & Christos A. Kontovas,
Balancing the Economic and Environmental Performance of Marine Transportation,
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART D 15, 458, 459 (2010) (a side-effect of
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Theoretically, the threat of civil penalties and criminal
punishment would induce the shipping industry, and eventually the
shipbuilding manufacturing industry, to modify their practice as a
whole to internalize the business externalities, viz., the environmental
and health impacts caused by air emissions from marine vessels.119
But before reaching that point, the industries have to first internalize
the increased shipping costs due to delays in voyages to obtain
compliant fuels, 120 or otherwise face possible civil penalties. The
industry tends to respond by using cost-saving measures that usually
require less capital investment than new engine designs or ship
retrofitting.121 Generally speaking, under the pressure of both the
higher environmental standards and continued preference of cheaper
carriers from powerful clients such as oil companies,122 ship owners
would choose to register their international vessels in countries where
MARPOL is implemented much less seriously,123 even though no
differentiated treatment based on flag state is afforded officially,124
hire cheaper and usually ill-trained seafarers who are more likely to
cause environmental violations, and demand standard quality ships to

requiring speed reduction, a way to reduce ship emissions, in short but sometimes
deep sea shipping may induce a shift to more environmentally intrusive land-based
transport modes).
119
See Stephen J. Darmody, The Oil Pollution Act’s Criminal Penalties: On
a Collision Course with the Law of the Sea, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89, 118-21
(1993).
120
See infra text accompanying notes 127-34.
121
See generally Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 145 (for a Selective
Catalytic Reduction system for NOx control, a 2.7 years of payback period is
required for 100% return on investment; for a Humid Air Motor system for NOx
control, a 3.8 years of payback period is needed for a 51% return on investment for
a new ship, and a 4.2 years of payback period is needed for a 37% return on
investment for retrofitting).
122
KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 40 (the volatile freight rates
during the past few decades have caused oil companies to count for the cheapest
available rate at any time, and therefore tend to favor sub-standard operators).
123
See generally DEP’T OF TRANSP., COMPARISON OF U.S. AND
FOREIGN-FLAG
OPERATING
COSTS
68-69
(2011),
available
at
http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Comparison_of_US_and_Foreign_Flag_
Operating_Costs.pdf (the higher environmental costs when operating in the United
States is one main reason accounting for the higher operational costs incurred by
U.S. flagged vessels than foreign-flagged vessels).
124
See 33 U.S.C. § 1902 (5)(A), (B) (2008).
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be delivered at the lowest price possible.125 In response, shipbuilders
often use cheaper materials, rendering ships more vulnerable.126
For different reasons, including the limited time and
resources of administrative agencies to undertake thorough
inspections or bring prosecutions, or simply “good luck,” 127 the
number of vessels that operate in full contravention with MARPOL
remains “unacceptably high,” both in the United States 128 and
internationally.129 Apparently, some vessels are still able to continue
business as usual by taking the risk of being caught then
implementing those cost-saving measures discussed above. 130
Arguably, one reason for the large number of violations could be that
the punishment is not severe enough to carry a sufficient deference
effect. However, given the precedents of imposing a criminal fine in
the millions of dollars,131 a more plausible inference should be that
the MARPOL standards have not operated in synergy with the
economics of the maritime transport sector.132 In fact, this lack-ofKHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 6.
Id.
127
See ROSS A. KLEIN, supra note 114 (many reports of MARPOL
violation have come from citizen observations and therefore detection of violations
could be missed, unless the cruise ship staff and the company for which they work
report voluntarily); Jeanne M. Grasso & Gregory F. Linsin, United States: Current
Trends in MARPOL Enforcement – Higher Fines, More Jail Time, The Banning of Ships, and
Whistleblowers
Galore,
MONDAQ
(Oct.
7,
2011),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/148086/Marine+Shipping/Current+Tre
nds+In+MARPOL+Enforcement+Higher+Fines+More+Jail+Time+The+Banni
ng+Of+Ships+And+Whistleblowers+Galore (more than 50% of the MARPOL
cases in recent years stem from whistleblowers making reports to the Coast Guard).
But the number of whistleblowers for Annex VI violations might decrease as it
would be rather difficult to detect excessive air emission with naked eyes.
128
David P. Keho, United States v. Abrogar: Did the Third Circuit Miss the
Boat? 39 ENVTL. L. 1, 41 (2009).
129
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), COST
SAVINGS STEMMING FROM NON-COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS IN THE MARITIME SECTOR 47 (2003).
130
See generally id. at 4 (about 5,000 to 7,500 substandard commercial
vessels are engaged in international trade).
131
Ionia, 555 F.3d at 310 (imposing a fine of $4.9 million (USD)).
132
This inference should not be simply rephrased as “the compliance
cost is too high.” Virtually no regulated party would ever gratefully applaud the
reasonableness or inexpensiveness of compliance measures. The meaning of
“synergy” can be understood from two perspectives: monetary cost and the
125
126
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synergy could well be the reason for IMO to finally consider and
agree with delaying the implementation of Tier III standards for NOx
emission for five years. The industry is frustrated with this expensive
“green storm.”133 More incentives in the enforcement regime for
compliance with MARPOL seem to be needed.134

prevalence of technologies to achieve compliance in the regulated industry. Of
course, the rare availability of necessary technologies that can be commercialized in
the market is accountable for the high monetary cost. See THEO NOTTEBOOM ET
AL., supra note 41, at 70-71 (concluding based on analysis of European shipping
industry that Annex VI requirements may be quite costly for the shipping industry,
driving up the cost by 25.5% to 40% depending on the specific type of low-sulfur
fuel used).
133
Remarks of Christopher Koch, President & CEO of the World
Shipping Council, World Trade Association of Philadelphia 2 (Nov. 8, 2013),
available
at
http://www.worldshipping.org/publicstatements/CLK_Philadelphia_Speech__November_8_2013.pdf
(criticizing
MARPOL Annex VI as “the single most expensive environmental regulation the
shipping industry has ever faced”).
134
See KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 17 (MARPOL is far from
really working).
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2. Deficiencies viewed from the perspective of foreign flagged vessels. One chief concern has been the non-availability of low-sulfur fuels
since IMO’s adoption of Annex VI. In the final working group report
to IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) at the
57th session meeting in 2008, the International Petroleum Industry
Environmental Conservation Association135 cautioned that the oil
industry did not expect marine fuels at 0.10% and 0.50% sulfur
content would be available to all regions by desired dates of 2015 and
2020, respectively.136
The availability of low-sulfur fuel under the scenario of full
compliance with MARPOL Annex VI is too complex an issue to be
generalized by a “yes” or “no” conclusion. 137 The prediction of
availability depends on the combination of multiple factors including
the enforcement area, fuel price, cargo load, volume of pre-purchased
fuels under the contracts between vessel operators and fuel suppliers,
projected capacity of refineries, shipping route, number of suppliers
at specific ports, and the type of fuel used. 138 Although some
135
The Int’l Petroleum Industry Envtl. Conservation Ass’n (IPIECA)
is the global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues
veering over half of the world’s oil production, formed in 1974 following the
launch of the United Nations Environment Program. IPIECA is the industry’s
principal channel of communication with the United Nations. About Us, IPIECA:
THE GLOBAL OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND
SOCIAL ISSUES (2013), http://www.ipieca.org/about-us.
136
See IMO, Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships: Report of the Working
Group on Annex VI and the NOx Technical Code, MEPC 57th Session Agenda Item 4,
MEPC 57/WP.7 (Apr. 4, 2008); see also MARPOL Annex VI Revision Signals New
Low-Emissions Era, Annex VI Special Report (May 19, 2008), available at
http://www.bunkerworld.com/news/magazine.download?magazine_item_id=120
(Linda K. Wright, Global Director at ExxonMobil Marine Fuels, warned at the
29th International Bunker Conference held in April 2008 that there is no guarantee
that sufficient low-sulfur fuel will be available and the oil industry’s misgivings
about the significant refinery investment cost associated with producing more lowsulfur fuels).
137
See TETRA TECH, LOW-SULFUR FUEL AVAILABILITY STUDY 2-3, 11
(2008),
http://www.portoflosangeles.org/DOC/REPORT_Fuel_Availability_Study_Final
_041408.pdf.
138
See id. at 53-60, 62-67, 76; MICHELLE KOMLENIC ET AL.,
EVALUATION OF THE AVAILABILITY OF LOW SULFUR MARINE DISTILLATE FUEL
FOR OCEAN-GOING VESSELS THAT VISIT CALIFORNIA 9-12 (2008), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2008/fuelogv08/ appffuel.pdf.
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estimation findings are more optimistic than others, the common
conclusion is that low-sulfur fuel (less than 0.5% m/m sulfur
content) shortages exist mainly in Central and South America and
Asia, especially in China,139 Japan, and Korea.140
Ideally, port states should exercise their responsibilities under
Annex VI to formally establish equivalents, such as add-on exhaust
cleaning systems to reduce air emissions, which vessels shall use in
case of non-availability of low-sulfur fuels.141 Absent such formal
recognition of alternative compliance measures, the solution to avoid
regulative penalties would be to store up compliant fuels at ports
along the voyage when compliant fuel is available. However, for
foreign flagged ships which are registered in countries where lowsulfur fuel is likely to be unavailable and do not have predictable
schedules to visit U.S. ports, they seem to have little incentive to
purchase more low-sulfur fuel than what is necessary to sail out of
the ECA.142 When such vessels decide to visit U.S. ports again, they
may have to change planned voyages to buy low-sulfur fuel since the
compliant fuel is unlikely to be readily available at their departing
terminals.143 Otherwise, they would likely face criminal charges for a
“knowing violation” in the United States.144

Low-Sulfur Marine Fuel in the Pipeline, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 4, 2010,
10:56
AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/201209/04/content_15731857.htm (PetroChina planned to expand its provision of lowsulfur bunker to Yangshan port near Shanghai to satisfy increased demand).
140
See TETRA TECH, supra note 137, at 68-72; DET NORSKE VERITAS
(DNV), supra note 49, at 15 (highly uncertain as to whether the availability of low
sulfur fuel will be adequate in worldwide ports); KOMLENIC ET AL., supra note 138,
at 57; Starcrest Consulting Grp., Evaluation of Low Sulfur Marine Fuel Availability
– Pacific Rim 3 (2005), available at http://webcache.googleuser
content.com/search?q=cache:E8b1JJZr3g4J:www.portoflosangeles.org/DOC/RE
PORT_Fuel_Study_Pacific_Rim_Exec_Sum.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
141
MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 4, ¶ 1.
142
See generally Deal, supra note 41, at 4 (ECA compliant fuel, blend of
marine distillates and ultra low sulfur diesel, is about 25% to 30% more expensive
than the marine distillate fuel that is currently used in TOTE ships).
143
See id. (there is currently not enough distillate fuel to meet global
demand for the world’s entire commercial fleet to switch from residual fuel oil to
distillate fuel to meet fuel standards when operating in ECAs).
144
See supra text companying notes 73-87.
139
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Additionally, shipping companies have been using “slowsteaming,” a technique that emerged along with the soaring fuel
prices in 2002 and global environmental movement for greenhouse
gas reduction, to reduce fuel cost.145 Some voyages now take longer
than they used to.146 The increased expenditure on fuels to comply
with Annex VI would only make this practice more prevalent, at least
in the short term. As such, an enforcement regime that structures
itself around the “panacea” of criminal liability, 147 coupled with
issues associated with the availability of low-sulfur fuel and the costsaving culture of the shipping industry, is likely to operate contrary to
the intent of Annex VI of preserving the freedom of navigation on
the high seas.148
3. Deficiencies viewed from the U.S. perspective. - Litigation arising
from the enforcement of Annex VI on specific vessels has been silent
except for suits against the creation of ECA. 149 Given that the
memorandum between the EPA and the Coast Guard to enforce
Annex VI was only signed in 2012,150 current enforcement venue can

145
See Remarks of Christopher Koch, supra note 133; RASMUS
JORGENSON, SLOW STEAMING: THE FULL STORY, MAERSK 2, available at
http://www.maersk.com/Innovation/WorkingWithInnovation/Documents/Slow
%20Steaming%20-%20the%20full%20story.pdf.
146
See Ronald D. White, Ocean Shipping Lines Cut Speed to Save Fuel Costs,
L.A. TIMES (July 31, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/31/business/la-fislow-sailing-20100731 (some freighters were taking fifteen days to make a Pacific
crossing that used to take eleven days).
147
See Keho, supra note 128, at 41 (the U.S. Department of Justice has
used a two-pronged approach that involves the prosecution of both the corporate
ship operators and chief engineers or other supervisory crew members as the best
way of changing the non-compliance culture and increasing deterrence in the
shipping industry); Darmody, supra note 119, at 143.
148
See MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 5, Regulation 18, ¶ 2.2 (no
delay or change of planned voyages shall be required to achieve compliance).
149
See Alaska v. Kerry, No. 3:12-cv-00142-SLG, 2013 U.S. Dis. LEXIS
133687, at 21-100 (D. Alaska 2013) (State of Alaska sued the Secretary of States
and the EPA for the designation of ECA under the APPs and the Administrative
Procedure Act but the suit was dismissed by the court).
150
Memorandum of Understanding Between United States Coast
Guard and United States Environmental Protection Agency Regarding
Enforcement of Annex VI as Implemented by the Act to Prevent Pollution from
Ships, June 27, 2011, available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
documents/annexvi-mou062711.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
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be presumed to be primarily administrative. 151 But the effective
administration of compliance by foreign flagged vessels, especially
those registered in countries where Annex VI is not fully enforced
and do not participate regularly in the U.S. commerce, is likely to
become more difficult.
As the Annex VI enforcement scheme rolls out, incidents
where “knowing violation” could be established are likely to increase,
despite the deterrence effect of criminal charges. On the one hand,
the number of foreign flagged vessels calling at U.S. ports is likely to
increase continuously.152 The total number of vessels of the top
twenty-five flags of registry was 28,178 as of January 31, 2013,
increased by 14% of the total in 2010.153 This 14% increase comes
almost entirely from countries and regions where no ECAs are
designated.154 On the other hand, the situation of low-sulfur fuel
shortages and lack of regulation on engine designs is likely to
continue due to some foreign countries’ reluctance to adopt
regulations to enforce Annex VI during the next few years.155 Many
vessels might still choose to keep their businesses as usual, especially
if they do not spend much time in ECAs. Furthermore, “knowing
violation” is a low threshold for finding criminal liability, 156
See generally KLEIN, supra note 114, at 17-28 (violations of MARPOL
standards are largely revealed by reviewing of ship logs and reports from citizen
observations; as such, a large number of violations may not be detected).
152
See America’s Ports: Gateways to Global Trade, AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION
OF
PORT
AUTHORITIES
(2013),
http://www.aapaports.org/Industry/content.cfm?ItemNumber=1022 (by 2020, the total volume of
cargo shipped by water is expected to be double that of 2001 volumes).
153
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Top 25 Flag of Registry (Sept 27, 2013),
http://www.marad.dot.gov/library_landing_page/data_and_statistics/Data_and_S
tatistics.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
154
Id. These countries and regions include Liberia, Marshall Islands,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Malta, China, Japan, Antigua and Barbuda, and Malaysia.
Id.
155
See supra section III, C, 2.
156
See David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: The
Evolution of Criminal Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 2009 UTAH L.
REV. 1223, 1235 (2009) (numerous commentators criticized that the Congress had
reduced the mental state requirement for environmental crime when it changed the
“willfulness” standard to the “knowingly” standard, and the number of
environmental criminal cases surged because of the adoption of this standard); see
also Wesley D. Sherman, The Economics of Enforcing Environmental Laws: A Case for
151
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considering the practical difficulties for some vessels to obtain means
to achieve compliance. Courts have also been relaxing the standard of
proof to establish the required mens rea in environmental crime
cases. 157 Such a relaxed threshold for finding criminal liability
expands prosecutorial discretion,158 which could counterbalance the
deterrence effect of these environmental laws.
To deter crimes, one fundamental economic theory is that the
expected cost of punishments on the violators should exceed the
gains from violation.159 If p is the possibility of being criminally
charged and M is the monetary loss incurred because of the criminal
charge and eventual penalties, the expected cost of punishments is
p×M.160 For vessel owners, the gain from a violation is primarily the
avoided capital investment in the air emission control measures to
maintain the operational cost at the pre-regulation level. If such
capital investment is C, non-compliance seems to be more attractive
economically if C > p×M.
To enhance the deterrence effect, enforcement agencies
could try to increase p, the possibility of a criminal charge. A major
Limiting the Use of Criminal Sanctions, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 87, 95, 104
(2007) (culpability should be established based on a higher level of mens rea than
“knowing” violation considering that courts do not require the knowledge of the
environmental law at issue, the seriousness of the penalties, and the complexity of
the environmental laws).
157
See Darmody, supra note 119, at 122-26.
158
Uhlmann, supra note 156, at 1242.
159
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76(2)
THE J. OF POLITICAL ECON. 169, 180 (1968).
160
This formula is adapted from Becker’s proposal. In Becker’s
formula, the cost of punishments is the probability of conviction multiplied by
costs to the offender. But deterrence should arguably take effect when an offender
thinks of the possibility of being served by a court order. So the actual cost of
punishments could be distorted since the actual conviction is also affected by many
technicalities of the trial process, and tends to be smaller than the probability of
being charged. These technicalities of the trial process might not play in the minds
of offenders when they learn the charges through word of mouth and media
exposure, and feel being deterred. Alternatively, the cost of punishment may be
magnified if it is calculated based on the probability of detection, because the
discretion of government agencies and whistleblowers tend to make the actual
number of criminal proceedings brought against the offenders less than the
number of detected violations.
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implication is on agency budget because criminal convictions are
generally more costly than agency adjudication.161 Also, enforcing the
implementation of corrective action plans, as in the Ionia case, could
be lengthy.162 If no additional budget is allocated, agencies might be
left with wide prosecutorial discretion to decide whether to bring an
enforcement proceeding. 163 Courts are generally deferential to
prosecutor discretion164 as it is a function of resource allocation,
policy considerations, and the delegation of power from Congress to
allow agencies to resolve the ambiguity of the statute.165 However,
even though foreign defendants are unlikely to prevail on claims
challenging such agency discretion in prosecuting Annex VI
violations, reputational criticisms from the public against such
practices may emerge, ultimately compromising the integrity of the
enforcement regime.
Alternatively, the severity of penalties could be raised through
judicial discretion to increase the cost of punishment, p×M. But, the
shipping industry has been using a controversial arrangement called
161
See Roger Bowles et al., The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal
Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy Implications, 35(3) J. OF LAW AND SOCIETY 389,
405, 415 (2008) (raising the probability of detection is costly); see also Wesley D.
Sherman, The Economics of Enforcing Environmental Laws: A Case for Limiting the Use of
Criminal Sanctions, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 87, 95 (2007) (a criminal justice
system is more costly than using administrative law to protect the environment).
162
See Sherman, supra note 161, at 85-88.
163
See David A. Barker, Environmental Crimes, Prosecutorial Discretion, and
the Civil/Criminal Line, 88 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1405 (2002) (prosecutorial discretion
became a concern when the Environmental Crimes Section of the Department of
Justice refused to prosecute a substantial number of referrals from EPA and
refused to consent to some prosecutions sought by local U.S. Attorneys); see
generally Charles J. Babbitt et al., Discretion and the Criminalization of Environmental Law,
15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3-4 (2004) (environmental administrators and
the prosecutors to whom they refer criminal cases together enjoy very broad
prosecutorial discretion, limited primarily by the Constitution and the rules of
prosecutorial ethics).
164
See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1984) (holding
non-mutual collateral estoppel does not apply to governmental litigant); see also
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (“the good sense of
prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries
must be trusted”).
165
See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the
Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J.
2407, 2453, 2456, 2460 (1995).
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“one-ship” companies to limit their exposure to liability.166 Under
such arrangements, shipping carriers are shielded behind the
corporate veil by organizing companies for the sole and explicit
purpose of owning that ship.167 The limited capital of such shell
companies is likely to hinder the fulfillment of judgment, particularly
concerning the payment of huge criminal fines. Moreover, unlike the
compensation and penalty calculation in oil spill cases, the estimation
of the economic harm to third parties caused by inhaling additional
air pollutants such as SOx and NOx from a vessel tend to be more
speculative, primarily because of the considerable lapse between
exposure to air pollutants and actual formulation of diseases,
numerous intervening causes, and the difficulties in measuring the
scale of harmful level of exposure. Hence, non-monetary sanctions
seem to be a more pragmatic redress to Annex VI violations.168
As to the capital investments by foreign vessels to achieve
compliance, C, the EPA could play only a limited role except for
trying to engage industries to provide sufficient low-sulfur fuels.
Foreign manufacturers and buyers of ocean-going vessels169 would
have to decide together who should bear the up-front cost of
advanced design170 if the buyers intend that their ships meet Annex
VI standards. 171 The buyers also need to take into account

KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 34-35.
Id.
168
See Roger Bowles et al., The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal
Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy Implications, 35(3) J.L. & SOC’Y 389, 405 (2008).
169
See generally MICKEVICIENE, supra note 117, at 207 (China has
surpassed Japan in 2006 in ship building. South Korea, in 2009, became a main
player in the global ship building industry, exporting ships to about 169 countries
and regions, mainly to Asia and Europe).
170
See generally ALAN E. BRANCH, ELEMENTS OF SHIPPING 28 (8th ed.
2007) (in choosing the type of ship to be built, the ship-owner must consider the
primary trade in which she is to operate, which governs the size and propelling
machinery, and the cost and availability of fuel, the length and duration of voyages,
minimum carrying capacity required, and other technical and statutory
considerations); see also Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 136, 147 (switching to
LNG would increase shipbuilding costs by 20 to 25%).
171
See MICKEVICIENE, supra note 117, at 202, 214 (government
subsidies and favorable loads, mandatory requirements on domestic ocean going
ship buyers to order ships at domestic yards, and cheap labor are the main reasons
for China’s high-order book volumes).
166
167
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technological developments and associated uncertainties 172 during
the time lapse between the order and delivery.173 In many countries,
governments are extending generous credit facilities, subsidies,
favorable tax treatment, and direct investment grants to maintain
their national yards as competitive in the global market.174 These
financial instruments, at the discretion of foreign governments, could
be powerful instruments to impose Annex VI compliance conditions.
In contrast, the regulative authority of a U.S. government agency
appears pale in these contract negotiations.
III.
A.

MAKING “ENDS” MEET

The Need for Market-Based Requirements

Previous discussions on the deficiencies of the Annex VI
enforcement regime indicate that certain additional elements may be
necessary to change the weights of the two sides of the formula. An
option that is within the control of the EPA is to provide incentives,
so that C – I < p×M, where I is the monetary incentives obtained
from participating in governmental programs.
Programs that are initiated by the government and industry
leaders to provide incentives to induce wider voluntary compliance
based on market-based principles, often referred to as Market-Based
Mechanisms (MBMs), are not new in the United States.175 MBMs
172
See Frederick Adamchak & Amokeye Adede, LNG AS MARINE
FUEL, 7 (Gas Technology Institute training materials, 2013) (one main problem
with using LNG as marine fuel is the “chicken-and-egg” situation between ship
owners. This is when developers for LNG fueling infrastructures and ports remain
uncertain as to who would and should act first), available at
http://www.gastechnology.org/ Training/Documents/LNG17-proceedings/7-1Frederick _Adamchak.pdf.
173
World Shipping Council, The Liner Shipping Industry and Carbon
Emissions Policy, 17 (2009) (ships are often ordered in a set of four to ten. Moreover,
they are ordered three or more years in advance of delivery), available at
http://www.worldshipping.org/pdf/liner_shipping_co2emissions_policy_septemb
er.pdf.
174
BRANCH, supra note 170, at 481.
175
See generally EPA CLEAN AIR MARKETS DIVISION, AN OVERVIEW
OF THE REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET (RECLAIM) 1-2 (2006)
(RECLAIM is the first trading program in the national created to reduce SO2 and
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provide business operators means to reduce compliance costs as
much as possible176 while the industrial standard is under transition
in response to regulative changes.177 MBMs would also likely reduce
the practical disparities for shipping companies when they operate
worldwide, and eventually help overcome the political difficulties in
bringing comparable environmental standards to all voyages’ end
destinations.
MBMs are most suitable when the emission standards can be
achieved through alternative technologies and the cost of emission
abatement differs widely among regulated sources.178 Both of these
conditions are present in the case of enforcing Annex VI. In addition
to fuel-switching,179 the industry has also identified several alternative
technologies including selective catalytic reduction systems, humid air
motor systems, seawater scrubbers, and using LNG-fueled vessels.180

NOx
emissions
in
urban
areas),
available
at
www.epa.gov/airmarket/resource/docs/ reclaimoverview.pdf.
176
See ROBERT N. STAVINS, EXPERIENCE WITH MARKET-BASED
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS 2-3 (Karl-Göran Mäler et al. eds., 2001)
(holding all firms to the same environmental target/standard can be expensive and
sometimes counterproductive).
177
See Mel Davies, Emissions Trading for Ships – A European Perspective,
118(3) NAVAL ENG’G J. 131, 132 (2006) (ship emission trading could offer a way of
complying on short notice, as a transition mechanism in the face of increasingly
stringent regulations on a range of emissions from ship. The cost and long service
life of cargo vessels may render regulations that require drastic changes of industrial
standards within few years impracticable); See World Shipping Council, The Liner
Shipping Industry and Carbon Emissions Policy, 17 (2009) (a container ship capable of
carrying 8,500 TEU’s costs approximately $100 million (USD) and will be used for
20
to
25
years),
available
at
http://www.worldshipping.org/pdf/
liner_shipping_carbon_emissions_policy_presentation.pdf.
178
See James J. Corbett et al., AN EVALUATION OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE
INCENTIVES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM REGIONAL FERRIES: TECHNICAL
MEMORANDUM
TWO
14-15
(2004),
available
at
http://policy.rutgers.edu/vtc/documents/ProgEval.FerryEmissions.pdf.
179
See generally Theo Notteboom et al., ANALYSIS OF THE
CONSEQUENCES OF LOW SULFUR FUEL REQUIREMENTS 2 (2010) (alternative fuels
include low-sulfur fuel oil, marine gas oil, marine diesel oil), available at www.schone
scheepvaart.nl/downloads/rapporten/doc_1361790123.pdf.
180
Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 141; see also ENNIO CODAN ET
AL., IMO III EMISSION REGULATION: IMPACT ON THE TURBOCHARGING SYSTEM
2-3
(2010),
available
at
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Studies show that depending on the vessel’s conditions, the costeffectiveness of the same technology varies. Generally, compliance by
bigger vessels is less expensive than smaller vessels.181 Compared
with fuel switching, NOx abatement technologies take longer to
introduce because they usually take about ten years to be amortized,
and hence, more risk-taking is involved in investment.182 Vessels that
approach the end of their service life183 or those that spend a small
portion of service time inside ECAs are likely to struggle the most
under the current Annex VI enforcement scheme.184 It has been
reported that some shipping carriers have started passing the
increased compliance cost on to customers. 185 The increased
shipping price, an unintended effect of Annex VI, calls for the wellrecognized flexibilities that MBMs could offer.186

http://www05.abb.com/global/scot/scot267.nsf/veritydisplay/1abd7848c784998
1852578110051bee0/$file/IMO%20III%20Emission%20Regulation.pdf.
181
KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 13.
182
Id.
183
See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 26 (it is better for infrequent
visitors or ships with few remaining years in operation to just pay for the costs of
pollution); PER KÅGESON, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR REDUCING SHIPPING
EMISSIONS: A PILOT PROJECT FOR THE BALTIC SEA 10 (2006) (abatement of SOx
differs from that of NOx because a shift to low sulfur fuel might still be cost
effective even for ships that are approaching the end of their operation life),
available at www.airclim.org/sites/default/files/ documents/apc24_0.pdf.
184
See Mel Davies, Emissions Trading for Ships – A European Perspective,
118(3) NAVAL ENG’G J. 131, 136 (2006).
185
See Jim Romeo, New IMO Low-Sulfur Fuel Regulations Creating
Challenges for Vessel Operator, PROF’L MARINER (Nov. 8, 2012, 11:29 AM),
http://www.professional mariner.com/December-January-2013/New-IMO-lowsulfur-fuel-regs-creating-challenges-for-vessel-operators/ (ZIM Integrated Shipping
Services Ltd. said that it will implement a low-sulfur fuel charge of $20 (USD) per
20-foot equivalent unit for trade between North Europe/Mediterranean and all
North American coasts in both directions); see also Michiel Vervloet, Emission
Trading in the Shipping Industry: Where Goes/Is the Money? (Dec. 5, 2010)
(unpublished Masters’ thesis, Ghent University) (on file with University Library,
Ghent University), at 11.
186
See generally T.H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental
Regulation, 6(1) OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 17, 18, 30 (1990) (because emissions
trading allows the issue of who will pay for the pollution from who will install
pollution control measures, it introduces additional flexibility).
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Possible Market-Based Mechanisms (MBMs)

MBMs could be categorized broadly as emission charges or
emission trading regimes.187 Based on the “polluters pay” principal,
emission charges could take the form of a tax, an abatement subsidy,
or differentiated service fees. 188 Sweden pioneered differentiated
fairway dues at ports to encourage reductions in NOx and SO2
emissions at ports since 1998.189 Because all major ports participated
in this program, adverse economic impacts, if any, on port businesses
have not been evident.190 Norway launched a NOx tax, forming a
funding pool, which provides grants to fund vessels to apply
emission reduction technologies.191 Without getting into details, two
main concerns arise if a MBM is designed that voluntarily imposes
additional dues based on the environmental performance of vessels.
First, the program would risk diluting the force of Annex VI
enforcement regime by shifting the focus on vessels to ports,
weakening the regime’s deterrence effects. Adequate levels of
regulative pressure on foreign vessel owners should be maintained
since they have to invest in emission control measures eventually.
Second, viewed from ship owners’ standpoint, the purpose of the
environmental charges duplicates that of the civil penalties under
APPS.
Therefore, this comment focuses on the other two main types
of emission trading schemes: cap-and-trade and emission credit
trading. This comment argues in favor of an emission credit trading
mechanism based on a consumption-emission formula. This MBM

See DAVID HARRISON ET AL., ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR
REDUCING SHIPS EMISSIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1, 9, 29, 45, 66 (2005),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/pdf/task3_final.pdf; Tietenberg,
supra note 186, at 18-21.
188
See JINHUA ZHAO, IRREVERSIBLE ABATEMENT INVESTMENT
UNDER COST UNCERTAINTIES: TRADABLE EMISSION PERMITS AND EMISSIONS
CHARGES
18
(2000),
available
at
http://www.card.iastate.edu/
publications/dbs/pdffiles/00wp252.pdf; see also Tietenberg, supra note 186, at 2021.
189
HARRISON ET AL., supra note 187, at 45-46 (Germany, Finland, and
the State of Alaska also have such environmental programs at their ports).
190
KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 16.
191
Id. at 34-35.
187
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could be offered to the violator as a final leniency before the
prosecutor brings a criminal proceeding.
1. Cap-and-Trade (Allowance Trading). - Under a cap-and-trade
scheme, the regulatory body sets a figurative cap for total emission
on the industry, and allocates emission allowances to participating
companies, which are the existing pollution sources.192 Companies
may continue to emit pollution as permitted by the pollution amount
prescribed by the allowances until the allowances expire. When the
initial allowances run out, the companies are supposed to purchase
un-used allowance from other companies, which manage to reduce
emissions through improved technologies.193 The government might
auction off the allowances to the highest bidders or, in a
corresponding amount to the polluter’s historical emission data, free
of charge.194
Studies on cap-and-trade programs indicate that vessels could
potentially decrease a considerable amount of the cost on emission
control technologies through participation in such programs.195 For
SO2 emission reduction, a market-based approach that allows vessels
in ECAs to either undertake fuel switching, install exhaust cleaning
systems, or purchase SO2 emission allowances from other vessels
could save each vessel up to $63 million (USD), annually.196
One option is to create an emission cap based on
geographical area. Under this scenario, a macro-level design issue is
192
See generally EPA CLEAN AIR MARKETS DIVISION, AN OVERVIEW
REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET (RECLAIM) 1-6 (2006);
Tietenberg, supra note 186, at 18-20.
193
Id.
194
See generally Sergey Paltsev et al., ASSESSMENT OF U.S. CAP-ANDTRADE PROPOSALS 4-5 (2007) (the free distribution of allowances to upstream
entities may create an inequitable outcome whereby the emission costs are passed
on to downstream fuel users. Meanwhile, the revenue from auctioning permits
could be directed to those who ultimately bear the cost of abatement), available at
http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/38460/MITJPSPGC_Rpt146.pdf
?sequence=1.
195
See Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 151.
196
Wang et al., supra note 42, at 8233, 8235 (the estimation is based on
analysis of U.S. foreign commerce ships traveling in European or U.S. West Coast
ECAs).
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whether emission trading between different sectors should be
permitted. Some researchers’ answer is an ambitious “yes.”197 As an
initial matter, a sufficient number of participating entities are required
to keep the allowance trading market active.198 Permitting vessels to
trade with land-based emission sources not only ensures the scale of
the market, but also benefits the shipping industry substantially since
abatement costs for shipping are lower than that for land-based
installations in general.199 However, an over-inclusive trading scheme
might give more room for companies to buy allowances or use basic
cost-saving measures rather than being induced to invest in green
technologies. 200 To determine whether the participating vessels
would become “lazy” under such a program, an in-depth analysis of
the emission reduction capacities of different sectors, which operate
under quite different environmental and technical standards, would
be required.
Another option is to impose a cap on the shipping industry
itself. A major concern about the cap-and-trade mechanism is its
economic impact on the shipping industry as a whole.201 Reliance on
ocean shipping to transport goods internationally is expected to rise,
because ocean shipping is already one of the most economically and
environmentally efficient modes of long-distance transportation.202
See KRISTINA HOLMGREN ET AL., GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
TRADING FOR THE TRANSPORT SECTOR 69 (2006), available at http://www3.
ivl.se/rapporter/pdf/B1703.pdf.
198
See EPA Clean Air Markets Division, AN OVERVIEW OF THE
REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET (RECLAIM) 17-18 (2006)
(RECLAIM is criticized for not being an actually active market with few entities
participating in its trading actions).
199
HOLMGREN ET AL., supra note 197, at 69.
200
Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental
Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 231, 275-85 (1999).
201
WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY AND
CARBON EMISSIONS POLICY, 9-10 (2009), available at http://www.
worldshipping.org/pdf/liner_shipping_carbon_emissions_policy_presentation.pdf.
202
WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY AND
CARBON EMISSIONS POLICY, 9, (2009), available at http://www.world
shipping.org/pdf/liner_shipping_carbon_emissions_policy_presentation.pdf;
see
also KHEE-JIN TAN, supra note 117, at 7 (the biggest contributor to marine pollution
is land-based sources and pollutions from ships contributes a relative small fraction
of the overall marine pollution (12%)).
197
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Posing emission caps on the shipping industry is likely to force the
industry to eventually purchase allowance from other sectors where
similar cap-and-trade mechanisms apply.203 As such, a large amount
of money would flow into other sectors that are not subject to the
same air emission standards as the shipping industry.204 The emission
reduction in other sectors would be a proxy to verify the
effectiveness of emission control measures in the shipping industry.
The result would probably be an “open-ended” regime where the
actual emission reduction becomes difficult to track.
Further, a cap-and-trade mechanism might not be effective in
terms of engaging new polluters. Experience of the Acid Raid
Program of SOs trading shows that most of the trading under the
Program has been internal, namely, acquiring excess allowances from
within the company, rather than inter-regional or inter-company.205
If a cap-and-trade mechanism were applied to the shipping industry,
large international shipping companies, which are already leading the
industry’s emission reduction endeavors, would possibly prefer
obtaining extra allowances internally to avoid delays and transaction
costs. As a result, there might not be enough active allowances for
trade with new ships.
2. Emission credit trading. - A more straightforward model is
to focus on the difference in emissions between vessels, targeting the
non-compliant vessels. 206 The emission credit trading mechanism
would require the establishment of a baseline of different ship
models in terms of the correlation between the power output and the
amount of pollutant emission.207 Alternatively, correlation could be
WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, THE LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY AND
CARBON EMISSIONS POLICY 9 (2009).
204
See also IMO, Review of MBMs: Consolidated Proposal of Efficiency
Incentive Scheme (EIS) Based on the Leveraged Incentive Scheme (LIS) and the Vessel Efficiency
Systems (VES), Submitted by Japan and the World Shipping Council, GHG-WG 3/3/2
(Feb. 24, 2011), available at http://www. worldshipping.org/industryissues/environment/air-emissions/Japan_-_WSC_Consolidated_Proposal__GHGWG_3-3-2.pdf.
205
Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict between Tradable
Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principals, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465,
488-92 (2000).
206
See Vervloet, supra note 185, at 33.
207
See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 24.
203
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established between the energy efficiency index of a ship 208 or a
modification of the index,209 and the amount of pollutant emission
for the determination of the baseline. Trading entities should be
primarily vessels. The participation by ship manufacturers should be
limited or even prohibited, because the estimation of emission
amount would be too speculative before the vessel is put into
operation.210
The amount of credits that a vessel obtains would be
determined on the amount of deviation of the vessel’s performance
from this baseline. The most powerful credit generators are large
vessels that operate in ECAs for their entire service time. The
purchasers who would benefit most from this scheme would be
vessels that spend a small portion of their time inside ECAs.211 Noncompliant vessels could be offered to opt-in to this trading
mechanism; or else criminal proceedings would likely be brought.
This offer could also be made during the plea bargaining stage. 212
Such offer should be conditioned on the facts that render the
immediate implementation of compliant measures not cost-effective,
such as the fact that the vessel is approaching its service life.
Although, such program design requires a large volume of record
keeping, it is nevertheless necessary for conveying a clear message to
the polluters: this offer in lieu of criminal proceeding is not a way
See IMO, Amendments to the Protocol of 1997 to Amend the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol of
1978 Relating Thereto (Inclusion of Regulations on Energy Efficiency for Ships in MARPOL
Annex VI), Resolution MEPC.203(62) (July 15, 2011). The regulation requires ships
to be certified based on an assessment of Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI)
and all ships shall have Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plans. The EEDI is a
non-prescriptive, performance-based mechanism that leaves the choice of
technologies to the industry, as long as the required energy efficiency level provide
in Regulations 20 and 21 is attained. The amendment came into force on January 1,
2013. Id.
209
See Vervloet, supra note 185 at 33-34.
210
Id.
211
See Mel Davies, Emissions Trading for Ships – A European Perspective,
118(3) NAVAL ENG’G J. 131, 136 (2006).
212
See also James B. Nelson, Alternative Sentencing under the MARPOL
Protocol: Using Polluters’ Fines to Fund Environmental Restoration, 10 HASTINGS W.-N.
W.J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 1, 23-26 (2003) (advocating the use of alternative sentencing
provisions to MARPOL prosecutions to provide funding for clean-up projects to
correct the harm caused by the defendant’s actions).
208
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through which vessels could pay to pollute, but only a regulative
mercy considering the violator’s economic hardship.
Additionally, participating foreign-flagged vessels should be
required to designate local agents for service of process. 213 An
independent trans-governmental authority could be established to
monitor and verify the quality of credits.214 This entity could be
financed through the civil penalties collected from the non-compliant
ships.
C.

General Considerations on MBMs

Ideally, the MBM should be built under a bilateral agreement
between the United States and its major waterborne trade partners
that have not enforced Annex VI in full, such as China. Although
treaties and executive agreements are treated alike under international
law, an executive agreement would be preferable from a U.S. point of
view, because no advice and consent of the Senate would be required
as long as the executive agreement does not contradict statutory
provisions.215 The EPA would have the authority to run this trading
program under the 1990 Amendments of the Clean Air Act, which
added Title IV, relating to controlling acid deposition including SOx
and NOx.216
Manifestly, the influence of a governmental agency, acting on
its own, is rather limited when its ultimate purpose is to induce
domestic legislation in a foreign country. Therefore, the overall
structure of a bilateral agreement would lay a stronger foundation for
the subsequent agreements on the technical parameters of the MBM;
See SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., OVER A DOZEN
YEARS OF RECLAIM IMPLEMENTATION: KEY LESSONS LEARNED IN
CALIFORNIA’S FIRST AIR POLLUTION CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Chapter 1, 8
(2007).
214
See also Richard E. Ayres, Expanding the Use of Environmental Trading
Programs into New Areas of Environmental Regulation, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 117
(2000).
215
See Kathryn C. Wilson, The International Air Quality Management
District: Is Emissions Trading the Innovative Solution to the Transboundary Pollution Problem?,
30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 369, 384-85 (1995).
216
1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 101549, 104 Stat. 2399.
213
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the discussion of which could be led by agencies in the respective
countries. Further, high-level official negotiation is more likely to
identify and define the necessary flexibilities to connect the priorities
of the United States and targeted foreign countries in controlling air
pollutions. Given the facilitation by national governments, as
opposed to administrative agencies delegated with the authority to
enforce Annex VI under national laws, companies are more likely to
agree upon the qualifying emission reduction measures to meet the
same emission standards under Annex VI.
Finally, two important technical components need to be
agreed upon under the bilateral agreement. The first component to
be established is the eligible equivalents. 217 A clear mutual
understanding of equivalents would not only help keep the trading
market active,218 but also benefit the later monitoring and verification
of emission credits during implementation. The second component
to be clarified is the monitoring and reporting procedures. Safeguards
need to be established to prevent fraud and missed reporting, and
furthermore, to ensure information transparency.219 When necessary,
penalties should be imposed on repetitive violation of reporting
rules.220
CONCLUSIONS
The current U.S. regulatory scheme to enforce Annex VI
leaves an administrative vacuum in terms of ensuring foreign-flagged
vessels’ compliance when operating in U.S. waters. The conventional
combination of civil penalties and criminal charges is challenged
when the enforcement of international environmental law is achieved
through an uneven worldwide regulatory landscape and depends
See KÅGESON, supra note 62, at 18.
See Nikopoulou et al., supra note 9, at 149 (switching to 1% sulfur
residuals, without other alternative compliance measures, has the major
disadvantage in that it does not create cost efficient credits for trading in the
emissions’ markets).
219
See SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., OVER A DOZEN
YEARS OF RECLAIM IMPLEMENTATION: KEY LESSONS LEARNED IN
CALIFORNIA’S FIRST AIR POLLUTION CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, Chapter 5, 1-3
(2007).
220
Id. at 9-10.
217
218
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heavily on the technological developments in the private sector. This
comment recommends an emission credit trading mechanism as a
supplement to the current Annex VI enforcement regime. The credit
trading mechanism would encourage firms, based on their superior
knowledge about the market and effectiveness of various
technological options, to find the best solution in response to the
regulative requirements without compromising their valued
commercial interests. If the establishment of a credit trading
mechanism is initiated through high-level official dialogues, as
recommended by this comment, the U.S. enforcement agencies
would be afforded a proper platform to work with foreign agencies
to establish compliance equivalents under Annex VI. MBMs,
therefore, would serve an important role in making the current rigid
enforcement regime more adaptive during the transition period
where firms are yet to phase out substandard vessels and plan for
investments in vessel designs that are far more environmentally
friendly.
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